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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to invite the reader to reflect on the essence of truth 
and post-truth in two approaches present in humanities and social sciences: 
trans-humanism and post-humanism. The notions of truth and post-truth, just 
like those of trans- and post-humanism, do not have a single defining interpre­
tation. This implies disputes about what truth is and what is the role of man as 
an being, capable of creative activity, and thus of creating other entities and 
concepts describing them. However, the problem still remains the doubt as to 
what extent the ability of creative action allows man to know the truth (alterna­
tively, to establish it), and to what extent it leads us astray. Post-truth emerges 
as a proposition in the face of the impossibility of reaching a consensus on the 
former. It is similar in the case of trans- and post-humanism, as concepts offer­
ing improved, because more up-to-date, approaches to the exploration of the 
human being himself, the motives of his actions, and his progress. The issues 
are presented by means of a critical analysis of selected scientific discourses, 
including definitions and research approaches that are gaining popularity in aca­
demia of the so-called Western cultural circle. 
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TRUTH AND POST-TRUTH. HUMANS SUSPENDED IN-BETWEEN
Defining truth, almost from the dawn of human history, has been a field of 
constant dispute. Evidence of this is provided by numerous examples, not 
only from ancient, but also modern and contemporary philosophy. Due to 
the limited space of this text, only a few that are mentioned, most charac­
teristic for the epochs in which they were created. Let us begin with the 
classics. 
Aristotle’s conception of truth refers to the relation between the cog­
nitive subject and the reality it recognizes. This relationship, conditioned by 
the dispositions of the cognitive subject to undertake acts of cognition, can 
result in two states: compatibility or incompatibility of the intellect with 
the thing being under cognition. Truth is closely correlated with the cogni­
tive process itself, which is not identical for all human individuals. The close 
relationship between truth and cognition makes the former a multifaceted 
entity. Depending on the employed dispositions, named by the Stagirite as 
“senses,” “thinking,” and “desire,” truth reveals different aspects of its es­
sence. Despite its essential multifacetedness, it consists in the agreement 
between the intellect and the entity/thing (Pride 2013, 12). It is worth em­
phasizing this feature of truth: congruence, and therefore order, harmony 
(in the absence of this, we are dealing with falsehood). This conformity oc­
curring in the intellect, manifests itself through spoken judgments, verbal­
ized and formed into sentences. Language therefore plays another key role 
in the search for truth. Language modifications, especially with regard to 
the manipulation of meaning, carry serious consequences, “missing” the 
truth or creating its illusion in the form of the so-called post-truth.
The danger of substituting truth for its absence arises from a number 
of reasons, including intentional and unintentional ones, when the adjudi­
cating subject does not have sufficient knowledge of the thing. This issue 
imposes a distinction between two approaches: dianoetic (indirect) and 
noetic (direct) in arriving at truth (Bubble 2000, 73–74). 
“Disinterested love of truth” in Aristotle, according to Władysław Ta­
tarkiewicz, became the basis and leaven for the later achievements of the 
Stagirite, who left a powerful imprint on subsequent generations of schol­
ars, including our contemporaries (Tatarkiewicz 1998, 105).
Selected thoughts of the Athenian philosopher, developed and deep­
ened, can be found in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. The Italian think­
er and spiritualist identifies truth with being, noting at the same time that 
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cognition of being (thing) is preceded by being (thing) itself. Being is the 
cause of the cognition of truth, which is a universally real property; it is 
transcendent. St. Thomas identifies two roads to the one and only truth 
leading through reason and faith. Indispensable in this journey is the intel­
lect in its equally double aspect, as a practical intellect and a speculative 
intellect (Solecka-Karczewska 2010). Both serve to discover the truth in its 
ontic (truth about being) and logical dimension (truth about human cogni­
tion of that being).
Cognitive realism in the Thomistic conception was combined with cog­
nitive optimism resulting from the intelligibility of things, i.e. the fact that 
they are cognizable, they allow themselves to be known because they are 
logical, ordered, and purposeful. If they are not so, they cannot be known 
because they are disordered, chaotic, unpredictable, in constant, unpredict­
able variability (instability). The aforementioned cognitive optimism, while 
holding out the promise of the possibility of knowing things and the truth, is 
far from treating the cognitive process as easy and simple. The truth about 
being is not a simple construct. Its complexity results from the fact that 
substantial being has many accidental entities that require cognition, which 
again complicates the whole process of arriving at the truth. Aquinas, how­
ever, sees “signposts” that help man follow the right path (the path to truth). 
This results from the Thomasian concept of locating the thing to be known 
between two intellects, the intellect of the Creator (the cause of things) and 
the human intellect, which, thanks to the dispositions given from God, is 
able to find the truth (Krupińska-Sadach 2018, 301–302). It should be not­
ed, however, that in addition to the intellect, man must have the senses 
necessary in the process of cognition. The complexity of truth requires it. 
Through the senses we get to know the accidental qualities of a thing, while 
through the intellect we get to know its essence. The intellect in under­
standing and inquiring has the ability to understand principles, including 
those relating to the First Truth – God. From Him, as the First Truth, all other 
truths arise (Szymura 2018, 13–14, Belch 2006, 4). 
The Christian vision of man, truth and God was in Thomas an attempt 
to combine the two orders of science and religion. Ratio and fides can also 
be seen in Immanuel Kant, but here fides would correspond to trusting pure 
reason, for which the prototype of ideal being – the prototype – appears 
as unconditioned, absolutely necessary. Since God understood in this way 
is present in pure reason, it is impossible to prove his existence through 
traditional theology. It is also impossible to prove his non-existence. Pure 
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reason alone is the solution to this dilemma. According to the philosopher, 
God – the prototype, the prime cause of all other beings – is present in hu­
man thought. Reason is the space where “God – Idea” appears, being an 
ideal comprehended but not cognized (Surzyn 2014). What, then, would 
a person need such an ideal for? Primarily to be moral, but also as an idea 
guiding the logical construction of a system of rational concepts. Kant rec­
ognized, as did his predecessors, that truth is the correspondence of cog­
nition with the object (Kant 2001, 207). Nevertheless, it is impossible to 
define or establish truth, because each object, having specific individual 
features, depending on the disposition and experience of the cognitive 
subject, will present the truth only concerning it (the object), and, in addi­
tion, referring to a specific moment of existence/being in time of the ob­
ject and the cognitive subject. Truth and error are located in judgments, 
which are constructed by intellect and reason. Error arises not from rea­
son itself but from its entanglement with the senses, which are also not 
the source of error, for they only provide material for judgment. The one 
responsible for the error is the intellectual illusion resulting from presump­
tion – a provisional judgment (Kant 2001, 208–209). To avoid it, a cognitive 
individual must be aware of his entanglement between the intellect and 
the senses and determine the sources of the influence of the senses on the 
intellect. Failure to do so brings persistence in error and building new, also 
erroneous, judgments on erroneous judgments. Self-recognition, which 
was postulated by the philosopher, is difficult also in the modern world, 
which reaches to the illusion of a superior, unconditioned idea, recognizing 
it (the illusion) as an ideal, model being.
A significant departure from, or even a negation of, the higher of these 
approaches was the concept of the supreme goal, of man and of values, as 
expressed by Friedrich Nietzsche. Life as a goal in itself, superior to other 
goals, individualistic and relative understanding of happiness, reevaluation 
of values, creation of a new morality based on strength – these are the 
main messages of the German thinker. As a classical philologist, he was fa­
miliar with the metaphors and allegories commonly found in the writings of 
ancient Greek and Roman authors. From them he drew patterns of inter­
preting the world, which appeared to him as conventional, illusory, relative, 
resulting from individual, personal perceptions and interpretations. What 
was real was what was useful, what served to satisfy the ambitions and as­
pirations of a strong individual, convinced of his superiority on the basis of 
such features as domination, egoism, egocentric utilitarianism. The ability 
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to empathize, pity, care beyond the circle of loved ones, was a trait of weak 
individuals, lacking the leadership, superior element given to superhu­
mans. The morality of masters should reign over the morality of slaves, 
only then the world will be properly ordered. Since there are more slaves 
than masters, the weak morality of the former dominates the world, distort­
ing its proper, desired image (Nietzsche 1999, Tatarkiewicz 1998, 164–168). 
The revaluation of values correlated with the new, inverted morality was 
coincident with the complete negation of God. In his philosophy, the mor­
tal Nietzsche “put to death” God, thus negating any objective truth, whose 
traces were tried to be found by thinkers such as Aristotle, St. Thomas Aqui­
nas and Immanuel Kant. The replacement of the Christian God by a man 
with extraordinary qualities of will, pride and strength became a method 
justifying the construction of concepts and ideologies based on the uncriti­
cal apotheosis of egoism and the absolute negation of everything that is 
weak because it is Christian. The concept of the Übermensch opened up 
to him the possibility, not only of creating, but also establishing new rules.
The presented, necessarily abbreviated, selected concepts of truth, al­
low us to turn our attention to another phenomenon, post-truth, well “es­
tablished” in contemporary cultures and societies, not only in the so-called 
Western civilization circle. This phenomenon has been presented on the 
example of two significant trends: trans- and post-humanism. 
HUMANISMS
Post-humanism has been present in the discourse of Western civilization 
since the late 1970s, generating diverse reactions, from extreme criticism 
to enthusiastic apotheosis (Hassan 1977, 1987). It is often confused with 
transhumanism, although these are two distinct orders of thought, entail­
ing specific actions in the scientific, political, or cultural spheres. Transhu­
manism sees the human being as a being in a constant state of becoming 
someone new, different, better, in transition. At least, this is and should 
be the goal – the elimination of basic human limitations – physical, bio­
logical, moral, ethical, etc. Julian Huxley, one of the pioneers of the trend 
expressed his hope and belief by writing: 
(…) I believe in transhumanism: once there are enough people who can truly 
say that, the human species will be on the threshold of a new kind of existence, 
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as different from ours as ours is from that of Peking man. It will at last be con­
sciously fulfilling its real destiny (Huxley 1957, 17). 
This can happen only on the way of scientific development and tech­
nological progress, engaged in the process of improving man, making him 
stronger, physically and intellectually fit, free from disease and disability, 
infirmity, old age and perhaps even death. Aubrey de Grey, believes that 
aging is in fact a disease that should be prevented and even treated, that is, 
undoing the effects (de Grey 2015). The British scientist is one of many 
representatives of transhumanism as the right path in human evolution. 
An evolution aimed at the self-creation of humanity. A similar position is 
taken by Nick Bostrom, a Swedish philosopher, one of the most active 
promoters of transhumanism in the 21st century. In an essay on transhu­
manist values, he points out the possibilities and still present limitations of 
achieving the goal. According to Bostrom, it is a matter of time when hu­
manity will solve the above challenges through biotechnology, nanotech­
nology, genetic engineering and artificial intelligence (Bostrom 2005). 
One example of a practical, and apparently successful, use of tran­
shumanist postulates is Kevin Warwick, who specializes in biomedical en­
gineering, cybernetics, and artificial intelligence. Described as one of the 
first cyborgs, he has used his body for experiments in BCI, the creation of 
the Brain-Computer Interface (BCI). The Cyborg Project, started in 1998 
and continued in subsequent years, was to see how well the human body 
would accept subcutaneously implanted micro-transmitters (the FRID 
technique) capable of sending and receiving signals from electronic devic­
es in the laboratory, responsible for room temperature, opening and clos­
ing doors, turning lights on and off, etc. The positive results of the experi­
ment made it possible to apply the above solutions in the case of people 
with damaged nerve connections, people who are partially or complete­
ly paralyzed (e.g. the cases of Jesse Sullivan, Claudia Mitchell, Cameron 
Clapp). 
Two decades later, the method of implanting implants concerns com­
pletely functional people. Services offered by companies such as the UK’s 
BioTeq or Sweden’s Bioxac deal with the commercial embedding of chips 
containing access codes for payment cards, bank accounts, medical IDs, 
electronic devices, etc. The rapidly growing number of purchasers, in­
terested in improving their functioning in the increasingly cyberneticized 
world, forces the need for market regulation of this type of goods and 
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services. In the case of the European Union, the issue has been addressed, 
among others, in a 2018 document commissioned by the European Par­
liament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) (document 
The Use of Chip Implants for Workers). The document points out the broad 
potential of this type of practice, however, with a high risk of uncontrolled 
and unauthorized use of data, including data on health status, type of in­
surance, data covered by professional secrecy, etc.
The so-called leakage of sensitive data, despite the current GDPR (The 
General Data Protection Regulation) is not uncommon, as evidenced by 
the cases of services and entities like Gmail, Facebook, Sony Pictures, Ado­
be, eBay, Heartland Payment Systems, UniCredit, (PZN Magazine, Cyber­
Defence24 2019). Even more so, it is arguable that access to data stored in 
personal microchips is more vulnerable to surveillance. 
Legal issues are important, as are moral and ethical questions. British 
philosopher, Max More in defining transhumanism juxtaposes it in a triad 
with humanism and post-humanism. He sees these three orders as inter­
related, based on trust in human reason, hope in the human capacity for 
unlimited development and progress, and above all, freedom from God as:
(…) a primitive notion invented by primitive people, people only just beginning 
to step out of ignorance and unconsciousness, people only just beginning to 
step out of ignorance and unconsciousness. God was an oppressive concept, 
a more powerful being than we, but made in the image of our crude self-con­
ceptions (More 1996). 
The hope for man, then, is man himself by unleashing his own intellec­
tual and organizational potential. More’s appeal resounds even more em­
phatically in the conclusion of the essay Transhumanism. Towards a Futur-
ist Philosophy, in which the author writes:
Humanity is a temporary stage along the evolutionary pathway. We are not 
the zenith of nature’s development. It is time for us to consciously take charge 
of ourselves and to accelerate our progress. No more gods, no more faith, no 
more timid holding back. Let us blast out of our old forms, our ignorance, our 
weakness, and our mortality. The future is ours (More 1996). 
More’s message, especially the last sentences of the passage cited 
above, reverses the order of thinking about human beings as unlim­
ited, nonweak, and immortal. Transhumanism, More argues, is a path to 
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a posthuman form of humanity: “Transhumanism is a class of philosophies 
that seek to guide us toward a posthuman condition.” (More 1996). 
Transhumanism, composed of many strands, has according to More 
a leading version, extropianism, emphasizing goals such as self-transforma­
tion, dynamic optimism boundless expansion, spontaneous order and in­
telligent technology. Thus defined, the horizon of the self-creating, human-
in-transition subject is to lead to freedom in the full sense of the word, 
happiness understood as joy, longevity determined by the will of the indi­
vidual, and total dedication to reason, logic, science and critical thinking. 
Heterogeneous understandings of trans- and post-humanism can be 
seen in many writings of contemporary authors. Added to this are issues 
related to the uneven interpretation of the ideas or postulates contained 
in these publications. For example, post-humanism is commonly associat­
ed with the end of humanity as such. Especially reading the Polish transla­
tion of Francis Fukuyama’s book, The End of Man. The Consequences of 
Biotechnological Revolution invites us to do so (Fukuyama 2004). Mean­
while, the title of the original does not indicate the end at all, but rather 
the beginning, and not of someone, but of something: Our Posthuman Fu-
ture: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (Fukuyama 2002). It 
can be assumed that the purpose of the above mentioned modification 
of the translation of the title, was strictly marketing publicity of the issues 
and a reference to another publication of this author about the end of 
history: The End of History and The Last Man (Fukuyama 2006). The om­
inous-sounding title of the Polish edition of Our Posthuman Future… los­
es its force in the context of Fukuyama’s own revision of the conclusions 
contained in The End of History. Leaving aside the aforementioned publi­
cations, the end of man does not have to come in the foreseeable future 
unless he himself contributes to it. Paradoxically, hope in such a context 
may lie in post-humanism.
The prefix post points to the state after, and in the word post-human­
ism to something that comes after the ideological and intellectual current 
which chose man as the main object of consideration, placing him in the 
center, according to the Renaissance and later Enlightenment traditions. 
The eighteenth-century fascination with the human mind, the belief in its 
unlimited development, and the belief in the growing power of man as both 
author and creator, further strengthened the anthropocentric view of man.
The need for a critical analysis of humanism, based on the Enlighten­
ment tradition, was raised at the end of the 1970s by Edward Said (Said 
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1978). He pointed to phenomena such as colonialism, its associated physi­
cal and symbolic violence, and the multi-generational destruction of colo­
nized societies. These were derivatives of secular humanism. Thus, to sim­
plify, humanism failed; the human being at its center did as well. This took 
on particular expression in totalitarian systems. Alexander Solzhenitsyn 
saw in secular humanism the beginning of Marxism, socialism and commu­
nism. He expressed this indirectly in the following words:
If, as humanism declared, man was born only for happiness – then why would 
he be born for death? But from the very fact that he is bodily condemned to 
death, his earthly task is, apparently, more spiritual: it does not consist in de­
lighting in everyday life and the best ways of acquiring goods and then joyfully 
consuming them, but in the constant performance of a difficult duty, so that 
the whole path of life becomes a path of moral perfection (translated by MB 
after Przebinda 1995, 130).
Rejecting the contested part of the heritage of humanism, posthuman­
ists propose a modified set of concepts concerning man – not his end, but 
a new stage in his development.
Development and progress imply passing through stages, each of 
which is better than the previous one. Post-humanism, then, would mean 
not dehumanizing human beings but restoring them to their proper place. 
This issue is analyzed in detail by Ann Weinstone in Avatar Bodies: A Tantra 
for Post-humanism, who emphasizes the posthuman autonomy of beings 
linked by mutual relations according to the egalitarian principle, as well 
as the principle of freedom of existence and self-determination. Also rel­
evant here is the principle of creation, including self-creation. (Weinstone 
2004, 10–11). Post-humanism, denying the main assumptions of humanism 
about the human supremacy over everything, the unlimited potential of 
human thought and the resulting right to omnistate (in the sense of ruling 
and creating), proposes to see humans as one of many equal beings – en­
titled to exist. This non-anthropocentric (or post-anthropocentric) view of 
reality presupposes a shift in focus from man to what lies beyond him. And 
beyond himself there are many inanimate and animate entities, the latter 
of which, in some cases, are characterized by intelligence and an advanced 
disposition to feel and communicate mental states (highly developed mam­
mals, some species of birds or cephalopods like octopuses).
Symbolic for humanism, the drawing of Vitruvian man, dictating prop­
er proportions in classical architecture, provides the message that the 
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proper measure is man. Thus, man was not only placed at the center, but 
became the center. Post-humanism in its various variants, more or less or­
thodox, rejects this position, and as Francesca Ferrando points out, it lo­
cates man “alongside” other entities, animate and inanimate, making them 
all interdependent existences. Hence it is impossible to treat these entities 
separately, but always in the context of multilateral relations. Importantly, 
relationships that mutually condition individual entities (Ferrando 2013, 32). 
Katherine Hayles, considering the potential embodied in the concepts 
that make up post-humanism, sees in them threats, but sees many more 
opportunities for humans as well, especially in the context of human-artifi­
cial intelligence relations. Man has a consciousness that follows completely 
different paths than the hypothetical consciousness of artificial intelligent 
entities (Hayles 1999, 283–284). Thus, the threat, or as Hayles puts it, “ter­
ror,” from artificial intelligence in the broadest sense of the term, in order 
to marginalize the human being, should not be exaggerated. The fact that 
modern man makes use of highly advanced technological solutions that in­
volve so-called artificial intelligence (e.g., in medicine – assisting in surger­
ies, diagnosing diseases, developing the composition of medicines, per­
sonalization of treatment or gene editing) is evidence that humans have 
already become posthuman. 
Drawing attention to the advantages and wide potential contained in 
trans- and post-humanistic concepts of perceiving human and non-human 
reality, combined with a non-anthropocentric view of the world, can pro­
vide inspiration for the gradual shedding of man’s greatest vices. Among 
them are: pride, greed, laziness, lack of restraint, egoism, self-centered­
ness, lack of respect for non-human beings such as animals. 
CUL DE SACS
The concepts of trans- and post-humanism quoted above emphasize the 
ambition of homo sapiens to create and “make” not only himself but also 
other non-human beings. Man in the light of these approaches becomes 
a creator. However, one can look the other way at the mentioned orders. 
A human being in the process of change, in-transition, and a human being 
who is able to get rid of the egocentric view, who sees the non-selfish val­
ue of non-human entities (animals, plants, animate and inanimate nature), 
as a post-human being can offer himself and the surrounding environment 
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much more than he has done so far. By including non-human beings in 
his sphere of care, he can strengthen and enlarge his own abilities, not 
only in the emotional sphere, but also in the aesthetic and ethical spheres. 
All of them, especially the last one, are formed through culture promot­
ing values such as empathy, cooperation, dialogue, openness. These values 
are induced in an individual through upbringing, education and training 
(Bildung). Neglecting these areas, especially when it comes to quality and 
availability (universality), leads to thoughtlessness, automaticity of choices 
and pretended responsibility. An individual, community or society acting in 
this way is reluctant to make the effort connected with reflection, thought­
ful choice or responsibility for the effects of their decisions. Why? Because 
they have not been prepared, taught, and practiced.
Bruce Thornton, analysing the phenomenon of still present evil, de­
spite common education, progress of knowledge and science, points 
to a kind of self-deception to which man succumbs, putting his hope in 
his own abilities. The author of Plagues of the Mind: The New Epidemic 
of False Knowledge, emphasizes an astonishing feature of man, who, with 
persistence, repeats his efforts based on the same assumption – his own 
limitlessness. Attempts to create an ideal social, political, and economic 
system, to eradicate injustice, misery, disease, war, and unhappiness, have 
not yielded the expected results (Thornton 1999). Currently, in the 20s 
of the 21st century, numerous armed conflicts resulting in suffering and 
death, are a telling proof of human weakness and inability to control our 
own instincts, based on primitive emotions. Emotions, especially the nega­
tive ones, provide the ground for post-truth, which is an attractive alterna­
tive for man disappointed by reason (Thornton 1999, Maddalena and Gili 
2020). Post-truth removes facts and their rational, logical analysis to the 
side, replacing them with free interpretation resulting from the “mood” of 
the expressing subject. This “mood” is correlated with a certain amount 
of knowledge that the subject possesses, to which he does not necessar­
ily have to refer. Recalling Dorothy Sayers’ words about the danger of the 
erosion of education (Sayers 1947), we ourselves become recipients and 
producers of post-truth. 
The following excerpts from The Lost Tools of Learning are a kind of 
diagnosis of the state of affairs:
(…) Have you ever, in listening to a debate among adult and presumably re­
sponsible people, been fretted by the extraordinary inability of the average 
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debater to speak to the question, or to meet and refute the arguments of 
speakers on the other side? Or have you ever pondered upon the extremely 
high incidence of irrelevant matter which crops up at committee meetings, 
and upon the very great rarity of persons capable of acting as chairmen of 
committees? And when you think of this, and think that most of our public af­
fairs are settled by debates and committees, have you ever felt a certain sink­
ing of the heart?
(…) we often succeed in teaching our pupils “subjects,” we fail lamentably on 
the whole in teaching them how to think: they learn everything, except the art 
of learning (Sayers 1947).
Dorothy Sayers, drew attention to another important issue, namely 
language, used imprecisely and all too often disorderly:
(…) Have you ever followed a discussion in the newspapers or elsewhere and 
noticed how frequently writers fail to define the terms they use? Or how of­
ten, if one man does define his terms, another will assume in his reply that he 
was using the terms in precisely the opposite sense to that in which he has 
already defined them? Have you ever been faintly troubled by the amount of 
slipshod syntax going about? And, if so, are you troubled because it is inel­
egant or because it may lead to dangerous misunderstanding? (Sayers 1947).
Through language and the notions established in it, man rebuilds the 
world, also in the aspect of fundamental notions such as truth. Careless­
ness about language, about its precision and, above all, about its correct 
use, leads into areas imitating truth, reflecting it in an impaired mirror. 
Post-truth as a result of linguistic carelessness, semantic disorder, emo­
tions and imagination, offers seemingly attractive solutions, “easier” be­
cause simplified, not requiring thorough knowledge from the recipient. 
This should be seen as the strengthening of post-truth as one of the el­
ements of contemporary communication, not only in the media sphere, 
but also in areas such as politics or science. The postmodern motto, taken 
from Nietzsche, that truth is “a moving army of metaphors, metonymies, 
anthropomorphisms,” that “truths are illusions,” “metaphors that have 
worn out and lost their sensuous power of expression” (Nietzsche 1993, 
189), encourages new paths and new goals. The post-truth man has again 
come to trust himself and his “new” unveiling as an in-transition being who 
has left behind what is human.
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The Nietzschean vision of man wandering in the darkness of existence, 
however, has its opposition in the concepts of the philosophers cited at 
the beginning of this paper, especially St. Thomas Aquinas, who empha­
sized one way for man and one way to truth. Also for Aristotle, a pagan, 
truth is one and results from the compatibility (going further: harmony) of 
an entity and a cognizing subject. Similarly, Kant recognizes the fundamen­
tal role of the prototype, absolutely necessary for the formation of rational 
concepts, essential in the process of cognition and identification of truth. 
The postmodern humanities and social sciences, proposing various 
concepts of interpreting and formating our world, offer many different 
ways. Many of them are a cul de sac, with the guiding principle of post-
truth. The same may apply to post- and transhumanism as collections 
of attractive but also conflicting ideas. Assuming that the world is based 
on binary oppositions, by choosing the principle of truth, a path without 
a dead-end can be chosen. 
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